[VOIPSEC] An issue of trust?

[Randell Jesup]

"Andre Fucs de Miranda" <afucs-listas at mandicmail.com> writes:
>I guess that we agree that although the SIP protocol won't matter, it matters
>how the SIP network is designed as any reasonable lawful interception
>environment should be completely transparent to the monitored individual.
>Based on what I know, the easier way to do it is probably by deploying a
>star-like topology for the subscribers-switch loop. No big mystery. No big
>cost. Any reasonable SIP or MGCP switch or SBC should be already capable of
>handling the CALEA requirements.

An SBC (or equivalent) setup has issues when the provider of the proxy
doesn't also control the access link to the subscriber.  The issues have to
do with call quality, and to enable the 1 in 100,000,000 chance a call will
need to be intercepted (excluding police states or "trolling"...), ALL
calls will be slightly to severely negatively impacted (added delay, packet
loss, point of failure).  And the cost is far from negligible as the
revenue model shifts away from traditional POTS models.

-- 
Randell Jesup, Worldgate (developers of the Ojo videophone), ex-Amiga OS team
rjesup at wgate.com
"The fetters imposed on liberty at home have ever been forged out of the weapons
provided for defence against real, pretended, or imaginary dangers from abroad."
		- James Madison, 4th US president (1751-1836)