[VOIPSEC] An issue of trust?

Fri Jun 16 17:46:53 CDT 2006

Andrew,

That's great... I was starting to think that I was mistaken. :-) Sorry for
the previous reply I was just being a little bit ironic since it seems that
CALEA impact on the VoIP business is being over weighted.

I guess that we agree that although the SIP protocol won't matter, it matters
how the SIP network is designed as any reasonable lawful interception
environment should be completely transparent to the monitored individual.
Based on what I know, the easier way to do it is probably by deploying a
star-like topology for the subscribers-switch loop. No big mystery. No big
cost. Any reasonable SIP or MGCP switch or SBC should be already capable of
handling the CALEA requirements.

Respectfully.

Andre

---- Mensagem Original ----
From: "Zmolek, Andrew \(Andy\)"
To: "Andre Fucs de Miranda" , voipsec at voipsa.org
Sent: Sex, Junho 16, 2006 6:02 pm
Subject: RE: [VOIPSEC] An issue of trust?
> Yes, CALEA solutions for SIP exist today and are presumably implemented
> by all the major carriers (often via SBCs). That wasn't the point of my
> post, but from a CALEA point-of-view, it doesn't matter if the SIP
> protocol itself isn't friendly to its aims so long as there's a point at
> which the desired information can be accessed.
>
>
> /\\//\Y/\   Andy Zmolek  |  zmolek at avaya.com  |  303-538-6040
>             GCS Security Technology Development  |  Avaya, Inc.
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Voipsec-bounces at voipsa.org [mailto:Voipsec-bounces at voipsa.org] On
> Behalf Of Andre Fucs de Miranda
> Sent: Friday, June 16, 2006 2:55 PM
> To: voipsec at voipsa.org
> Subject: Re: [VOIPSEC] An issue of trust?
>
> Andrew,
>
> I thought that CALEA could already be achieved in SIP environments using
> all the major SBCs and Carrier Class VoIP switches. Am I wrong?
>
> Respectfully,
>
> --
> Andre Fucs
> http://www.fucs.org/portugues/
>
>
> ---- Mensagem Original ----
> From: "Zmolek, Andrew \(Andy\)"
> To: "Tyler Johnson" , Ron_Cramer at cargill.com, Voipsec at voipsa.org
> Sent: Sex, Junho 16, 2006 3:40 pm
> Subject: Re: [VOIPSEC] An issue of trust?
>> CALEA doesn't break E2E security, so long as you're encrypting with
>> technology not under the control of a service provider (or SP
>> equivalent) who must comply with it. Federal policy doesn't prevent
>> E2E security today, but it's laughable to think it's worthwhile to
>> expect changes to US regulations that mandate E2E security unless
>> you're willing to extend CALEA to cover all P2P technology as well.
>>
>> There are plenty of good E2E security solutions that can be put in
>> place by end-users or businesses that are carrier-independent, but
>> none of them has that critical mass of implementation yet and
>> interoperability between most of these solutions are poor candidates
>> for widespread use because of two simple problems:
>>
>> 1. Key management: so many different ways to provide keys, but the
>> most interoperable of these methods have point-to-point dependencies
>> (like sdescriptions over TLS for SIP) or require the prior existence
>> of a global PKI solution for all endpoints (and end-users) to leverage
>
>> (like many of the MIKEY variants).
>>
>> 2. Offer management: namely, how do I determine whether my device can
>> communicate with yours in a secure and interoperable way? The most
>> obvious way to do this in SIP would be with multi-part SDP offers, but
>
>> it doesn't take much testing to determine that a lot of today's
>> clients break when presented with a multi-part message. So we end up
>> having to look at SDP extensions or headers as a compromise that may
>> or may not work properly for backwards compatibility, but don't blow
>> up the client at least.
>>
>> BTW, ZRTP bypasses some of the key management problems but does so by
>> hiding signaling in the media (which creates a host of other interop
>> problems to solve which make offer management more complex). And yes,
>> the H.235.x family of security protocols does offer a few solutions as
>
>> well for the H.323 family but the applicability of those protocols
>> varies a lot and most of the H.235.x protocols are implemented by a
>> few vendors in ways that often don't lend them to interoperability.
>>
>> Moreover, the IETF prides itself on a history of not supporting
>> wiretapping through its standards, so don't expect the SIP community
>> to engineer this kind of support at the protocol level any time soon.
>> And just in the key management realm, they've still got 11 candidates
>> in play after 5+ years of work in this area, with no clear consensus
>> in sight despite general agreement that the problem needs to be solved
>
>> quickly.
>>
>> Bottom line: no one entity with leverage in this area has enough
>> political might to break up this logjam, so expect the impasse on this
>
>> encryption/wiretapping issue to hang around until the balance of power
>
>> changes in a big way. That may or may not happen in my lifetime. In
>> the mean time, one should expect balkanization to be the overall rule
>> with multiple peering communities built along each of the major usage
>> profiles (large enterprise, small-to-midsize carrier-oriented
>> communities, PC-oriented consumers, etc.), each with their own
>> dominant solution based on their own priorities.
>>
>> /\\//\Y/\   Andy Zmolek  |  zmolek at avaya.com  |  303-538-6040
>>             Senior Manager, Security Planning & Strategy
>>             GCS Security Technology Development  |  Avaya, Inc.
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Voipsec-bounces at voipsa.org [mailto:Voipsec-bounces at voipsa.org]
>> On Behalf Of Tyler Johnson
>> Sent: Thursday, June 15, 2006 6:35 PM
>> To: Ron_Cramer at cargill.com; Voipsec at voipsa.org
>> Subject: Re: [VOIPSEC] An issue of trust?
>>
>> You can't. That's why you have to implement security at the
>> application layer. That means end to end encryption of media an
>> signaling. However, US regulations for CALEA break that. If you do hop
>
>> to hop security you really don't have any assurance of security beyond
>
>> the next hop unless you are in a limited federation, but that doesn't
>> scale to the whole Internet.
>>
>> I think the bottom line is to work to get coherent policy implemented
>> at the federal level in the U.S.
>>
>> The other possibility is to think about a new protocol that is
>> designed with security from the ground up, with wiretap in mind. H.325
>
>> offers an opportunity here, I think. I don't think it's going to work
>> to reverse engineer this into SIP or H.323.
>>
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> From:
>> To:
>> Sent: Thursday, June 15, 2006 6:46 PM
>> Subject: Re: [VOIPSEC] An issue of trust?
>>
>>
>>> It appears I should clarify my question in regards to a Telecom
>> Service
>>> Provider
>>> vs an Internet Service Provider.
>>>
>>> Based on my experience, many enterprises would choose to trust
>>> telecom
>>
>>> service providers
>>> to keep data traffic private on a traditional layer 2 service such as
>
>>> frame relay or voice services on POTS.  And, would choose not to
>>> trust Internet based communication, but to mitigate the Internet
>>> based risk with firewalls, encryption tunnels,
>> etc.
>>>
>>> Part of the logic used to differentiate between these two choices was
>> that
>>> the traditional layer 2
>>> services provided separation between the virtual private networks of
>> the
>>> many customers serviced
>>> by the Telecom Provider.  Since the packets are being forwarded at
>> layer 2
>>> the Telecom Provider
>>> had no awareness of anything related to the Internet Protocol.  This
>> also
>>> meant that the
>>> Telecom Service Providers customers could not use IP based attacks
>> against
>>> the carrier infrastructure.
>>>
>>> As Telecom Service Providers move to offer IP-ware services - MPLS,
>> VoIP
>>> or whatever
>>> the Telecom Service Providers are vulnerable to IP based attacks.  I
>> know
>>> there
>>> are many papers that state MPLS *can* be deployed with the same level
>> of
>>> security
>>> as a layer 2 service, but how can I *trust* the Telecom Service
>> Provider
>>> will invest
>>> the effort to operate a secure MPLS network.  Or, VoIP, or whatever?
>>>
>>> Thanks and regards,
>>>
>>> Ron
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Cramer, Ron - Ron_Cramer at cargill.com
>>> Sent: Thursday, June 15, 2006 1:19 PM
>>> To: 'Voipsec at voipsa.org'
>>> Subject: An issue of trust?
>>>
>>>
>>> The issue of trust for your Telecom service provider, either
>>> traditional or VoIP based seems to be a fundamental component for
>>> secure communications.
>>>
>>> Can anyone identify an industry standard that an Enterprise can use
>>> to establish trust with a Telecom vendor?  Something with well
>>> established decision criteria, not just a high level guide to
>>> performing a risk assessment.
>>>
>>> Thanks in advance,
>>>
>>> Ron
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Voipsec mailing list
>>> Voipsec at voipsa.org
>>> http://voipsa.org/mailman/listinfo/voipsec_voipsa.org
>>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Voipsec mailing list
>> Voipsec at voipsa.org
>> http://voipsa.org/mailman/listinfo/voipsec_voipsa.org
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Voipsec mailing list
>> Voipsec at voipsa.org
>> http://voipsa.org/mailman/listinfo/voipsec_voipsa.org
>>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Voipsec mailing list
> Voipsec at voipsa.org
> http://voipsa.org/mailman/listinfo/voipsec_voipsa.org
>
>