[VOIPSEC] Why a secure keyechange for media encryption?

[Hadriel Kaplan]

Hmm, I'm still not clear what you're referring to.  Presumably you mean
before the TLS connection is secure, that a MITM can become a TLS hop
between each "end"?  Because after that the only things I know of a MITM can
do is bring the connection down or jam it. (not that I'm the tls guru at my
company, but I talk to them a lot)

-hadriel


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Michael Prochaska [mailto:tm021090 at fh-stpoelten.ac.at]
> Sent: Monday, May 01, 2006 3:40 PM
> To: Hadriel Kaplan
> Cc: voipsec at voipsa.org
> Subject: Re: [VOIPSEC] Why a secure keyechange for media encryption?
> 
> > Define what you mean by MITM for that context.  A MITM between the two
> ends
> > of the TLS socket/connection?  Or just that a hop-by-hop SIP chain means
> > each hop is a MITM, or the chain could be broken somewhere?
> 
> between the two ends of the TLS connection.
> 
> regards,
> michael