[VOIPSEC] Key Negotiation for SRTP (Ahmar Ghaffar)
Robert Moskowitz
rgm at icsalabs.com
Fri Sep 2 12:03:13 CDT 2005
At 11:42 AM 9/2/2005, Mark Baugher wrote:
>Robert,
>On Aug 31, 2005, at 11:03 AM, Robert Moskowitz wrote:
>...
>>I just shudder at the reaction from certain quarters when they notice
>>that sdescription passing of keys is an automatic CALEA tool.
>
>I think you are misunderstanding something. sips is hop-by-hop by
>definition, sdescriptions is not. sdescriptions can use a
>end-to-end public key techniques as well as any alternative key
>establishment mechanism. But without a public key solution, MIKEY
>uses PSK and sdescriptions uses TLS, which is hop-by-hop in a sips
>context. Both have the issue that you mention above.
Ok, I was not clear. It was the following messages that I was responding to:
"From: "Christian Stredicke" <Christian.Stredicke at snom.de>
The latest idea would look like this: Transfer the key in clear text via
a secure protocol in the SDP.
[SDP m-line]
A=crypto:1 F8_128_HMAC_SHA1_32
inline:MTIzNDU2Nzg5QUJDREUwMTIzNDU2Nzg5QUJjZGVm"
"Sdescriptions is an interesting alternative, but as has been pointed about,
it is not an end-to-end security protocol, and would need something like
S/MIME etc. Hop-by-hop security (as with SIP/TLS) is not sufficient.
cheers,
Lakshminath"
"1) sdescriptions: Amounts to just sending the key in the clear (base-64
encoded) via SDP, and so needs a secure channel. There are two options
there again and one is hop-by-hop security using TLS and the other is
S/MIME. The question in my mind is whether sdescriptions is a long-term
solution (more on that later).
best regards,
Lakshminat"
So we have been discussing key exchanges where:
1) The SRTP session key is known to the SIP server(s).
2) If and SIP-to-SIP hop is not encrypted, the key is exposed to
eavesdropping.
Yes, a secure, end-to-end key exchange COULD be used.
We should select ONE that is relatively worth implementing and call
that the interoperable mode.
Robert Moskowitz
Senior Technical Director
ICSA Labs, a division of Cybertrust, Inc.
W: 248-968-9809
F: 248-968-2824
VoIP: 248-291-0713
E: rgm at icsalabs.com
There's no limit to what can be accomplished if it doesn't matter who
gets the credit
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