[VOIPSEC] VoIP and Banking Security

Mon Jun 27 12:39:18 CDT 2005

Brian,

Working for a vendor myself, I agree with you on one level - there are 
adaquate solutions for VoIP carrier and enterprise deployments - our 
customers are not hounding us to make them stronger. I would bet that 
yours aren't either. Why? Simply put, there's no money they are losing 
because of the current level of security - and no money they could make 
if they had stronger security.

But, the world of VoIP security is bigger than this. Carriers will lose 
money if they are the target of a DOS attack.  Carriers will lose money 
if some unauthorized carrier piggy backs on their network. I've actually 
SEEN that one happen; the money gets big quick.

My personal view is that there is a tipping point, where carriers and 
enterprises will have enough money at stake where some "evil doer" (this 
is not an endorsement of our President) will try to get some for 
himself.  I mean, can you name a single time in the history of man where 
big money was made, and criminals didn't try to go after some for 
themselves?  This is one of the times where trying to guess at the right 
answer like the ITU might be a bit better then waiting for the bombshell 
to hit and describe how it got solved like the IETF. (and this is not an 
endorsement of the ITU. I'm not a Geneva fan.)

One other thing - and I can't verify this.  If you were SBC, and you 
were getting hit up for VoIP extortion money, would you advertise it? I 
bet you wouldn't.

Tom

Brian Rosen wrote on 6/24/05, 4:59 PM:

 > This is at the heart of what the real big gorilla problem is with VoIP
 > and
 > security:
 >
 > We have an adequate set of tools available now to provide a service
 > that is
 > secure enough for most personal and commercial applications
 >
 > There is no consumer/customer and therefore carrier, and therefore vendor
 > demand for such a secure service.
 >
 > All of the work on taxonomy and requirements and whatever else we are
 > doing
 > fail to come to terms with the basic problem = no one cares.
 >
 > If they cared, all the phones and proxies would have the tools we have
 > today
 > implemented.  Security is very low on vendor priority lists because it is
 > low to non existent on customer priority lists.
 >
 > Yeah, I know all about PKI problems.  There are adequate solutions for
 > VoIP
 > carrier and enterprise deployments reasonably available right now.
 >
 > Perfect?  Not at all; but very, very reasonable security.
 >
 > THERE IS NO DEMAND
 >
 > Without it, better tools aren't useful.
 >
 > Brian
 >
 > -----Original Message-----
 > From: Voipsec-bounces at voipsa.org [mailto:Voipsec-bounces at voipsa.org] On
 > Behalf Of Andrew Graydon
 > Sent: Friday, June 24, 2005 11:34 AM
 > To: 'Michael Stauffer'; Voipsec at voipsa.org
 > Subject: RE: [VOIPSEC] VoIP and Banking Security
 >
 > I think there has been a lot of very good discussion on this point and it
 > does prove that as an industry we do not have all the answers. SRTP
 > should
 > solve these issues, but in itself is always possible to circumvent to a
 > skilled and dedicated hacker. The issue of putting SRTP on every
 > stream also
 > raises issues for implementation, both CALEA and enterprise/SP
 > deployments
 > will have to deal with this encrypted information.
 >
 > If we look at the current voice implementations on the phone systems,
 > this
 > level of security is not implemented and it's been working for a while
 > ! On
 > the IP side, while there are provisions for encryption of email traffic,
 > widespread usage of such encryption systems is not in use due to the
 > implementation and usage issues. For regulatory issues in some
 > industries it
 > is used, but mainly email is sent as the base clear text system is was
 > originally setup to do.
 >
 > We have to be careful as an industry to try to balance the security
 > issues
 > we see from a technical standpoint and the implementation and usage
 > issues
 > from a provider and end user point of view.
 >
 > These issues will be addressed in the projects starting in the Security
 > Requirements Committee and anyone interested in participating should
 > look on
 > the VOIPSA website for information on participation.
 >
 >
 > Andrew
 >
 >
 > _____
 >
 > Andrew Graydon
 >
 > Chair Security Requirements Committee
 > VOIPSA
 >
 > agraydon at voipsa.org
 > http://www.voipsa.org
 > -----Original Message-----
 > From: Voipsec-bounces at voipsa.org [mailto:Voipsec-bounces at voipsa.org] On
 > Behalf Of Michael Stauffer
 > Sent: June 23, 2005 7:33 AM
 > To: Voipsec at voipsa.org
 > Subject: [VOIPSEC] VoIP and Banking Security
 >
 > Al,
 >
 > Is being able to sniff DTMF Digits not in line with your wishes?  :)
 >
 > Looks like a RFC 2833 dissector to me, available in Ethereal.
 > So can anyone sniff these packets?  Well, in a properly configured,
 > switched
 > environment, it's not something that's done without effort, but a
 > malicious
 > agent with sufficient motivation and skill can capture these, yes.  (The
 > previous discussions from this list on the relative ease of capturing
 > in a
 > switched environment acknowledged).  I could be wrong, but I believe SRTP
 > would take care of this.  Thoughts?
 >
 > Mike Stauffer
 > BAH
 > VoIP Security
 >
 >
 >
 >
 >
 >
 >
 >
 >
 > Greetings,
 >
 > New here, and yes, I did check the archives first.
 >
 > I just finished a session with my bank using the touch pad on my phone.
 > When finished I dumped the packets captured during the transaction (using
 > ethereal).  I was a little dismayed and a lot alarmed to see wherever the
 > protocol was RTP EVE that the numbers I pressed on the phone were
 > visible in
 > the info field:
 >
 >      Payload type=RTP Event, DTMF Eight 8
 >
 > I'm guessing that if I can sniff these packets, so can anyone else.
 >
 > Anyone have any comments to calm my nerves?
 >
 > Thanks,
 >
 > Al
 >
 >
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