[VOIPSEC] Actual Attacks

[Mark Teicher]

Actual Attacks

SIP Proxy Impersonation
SIP Proxy Hijacking
Message Tampering - hard to devise an common exploit across VOIP platforms, but most likely possible
Denial of Service - depends on the packet, usually just causes a phone to reset, or a port to shutter on the gateway, call server more vulnerable due to the underlying operating system
Session Attack - hard to devise a common exploit applicabel across all VOIP platforms, possible on some of the well known vendors
Eavesdropping - more feasible than most, especially if some of the default features of the particular VOIP equipment is not configured properly.

-----Original Message-----
From: Robert Moskowitz <rgm at icsalabs.com>
Sent: Feb 25, 2005 1:56 PM
To: Brian Rosen <br at brianrosen.net>, 'Simon Horne' <security at isvo.net>, 
	voipsec at voipsa.org
Subject: RE: [VOIPSEC] Actual Attacks

At 09:36 AM 2/24/2005, Brian Rosen wrote:

>"Web of Trust" is a failed concept.  It works, but we have not been able to
>successfully deploy in a large scale.

But it CAN work for groups of friends.

>Certificate authority chains work only within an enterprise.  We have not
>really made them work well outside of that.

Check out ACES.

Check out the Federal PKI and work being done to duplicate it in commercial 
settings (drug industry for one).  Note I am the author of the Bridge CA 
model in the federal PKI.

Thing is you REALLY need a reason to get PKi s to work together.  Mail was 
never one.  Bout VoIP could be.


Robert Moskowitz
Senior Technical Director
ICSA Labs, a division of Cybertrust, Inc.
W:      248-968-9809
F:      248-968-2824
E:      rgm at icsalabs.com

There's no limit to what can be accomplished
if it doesn't matter who gets the credit



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