[VOIPSEC] Actual Attacks

[Christopher A. Martin]

That is very true...one of the primary requirements in many VoIP
deployments, including peering should be that of topology hiding...

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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Voipsec-bounces at voipsa.org [mailto:Voipsec-bounces at voipsa.org] On
> Behalf Of Geoff Devine
> Sent: Tuesday, February 22, 2005 10:17 AM
> To: Voipsec at voipsa.org
> Subject: RE: [VOIPSEC] Actual Attacks
> 
> Christopher A. Martin <chris at sip1.com> writes:
> 
> > - Standard DoS today in terms of flooding cannot be stopped, but it
> can be
> > handled in the Internet backbone (which often occurs transparently
> > so the rest of us don't see it).
> >
> > - Also standard precautions, such as deploying SIP aware firewalls or
> border
> > controllers which handle the media dynamically prevent a majority of
> port
> > scans and other direct attacks which low end devices are typically
> > susceptible to.
> 
> A side effect of using session controllers and their brethren in a VoIP
> architecture is that you make the IP address of the endpoint anonymous.
> This addresses both privacy concerns and makes DoS attacks against a
> subscriber endpoint less likely.  Any architecture that permits media
> streams to flow directly between subscriber endpoints is very vulnerable
> to DoS attacks on those endpoints.
> 
> Geoff
> 
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